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IMPROVING HANDICAPPERS' 
CIVIL RIGHTS IN 
MICHIGAN-PREVENTING 
DISCRIMINATION THROUGH 
ACCOMMODATION 
If you look around carefully, you will understand that 
people who are handicapped are just like people who 
are not. We are still people, who want the chance to 
walk the golden road to success. We don't ask you to 
give us success, just the chance to succeed without put-
downs or ridicule. 1 
Ten years ago, the Michigan legislature recognized the prob-
lem of discrimination against the handicapped2 and acknowl-
edged the need to provide handicapped individuals with an 
equal opportunity to succeed3 by enacting the Michigan Handi-
1. H. Parsons, Jr., The Handicap Plea (unpublished essay), reprinted in Dear Abby, 
Ann Arbor News, Aug. 22, 1986, at B2, col. 1. Mr. Parsons was born with German mea-
sles, which left him deaf, blind in one eye, and 50% brain-damaged. At the time he asked 
Abby to print his plea, he was 21 years old and a student at the Rochester Institute of 
Technology. 
2. A legislative analysis indicated that "[t]raditional attitudes often work against 
handicappers even though they are perfectly capable of performing the jobs for which 
they apply." Michigan House Civil Rights Comm. and Michigan Senate State Affairs 
Comm., Analysis Section, S.B. 749, at 1 (July 27, 1976) [hereinafter Bill Analysis]. The 
analysis further suggested that handicappers are denied equal opportunity in areas of 
public accommodation, education, and employment. Id. Another source described what it 
was like to be handicapped in Michigan in the mid-197O's: 
To be handicapped in Michigan with visible handicapping conditions is to be 
expected to be smiling, simple, helpless and grateful. To be handicapped with 
non-visible handicapping conditions is to be told that you are too dangerous to 
be allowed to work. To be handicapped physically and confined to a wheelchair 
is to be unable to carry on normal community affairs because of the barriers of 
steps, curbs, remote parking and lack of suitable public transportation, and to be 
denied employment because employers are unwilling to make reasonable changes 
in the working environment. 
MICHIGAN DEP'T OF CIVIL RIGHTS, STATUS OF CIVIL RIGHTS IN MICHIGAN 1973-1978 24 
(1978) [hereinafter CML RIGHTS]. 
3. Speaking in support of the enactment of the Michigan Handicappers' Civil Rights 
Act, State Senator Faust stated, "Handicapped persons wish to [be), and, when the legis-
lation is enacted into law, must be judged and accepted based on their ability." JOURNAL 
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cappers' Civil Rights Act• (MHCRA). The MHCRA prohibits 
discrimination in several areas-employment, housing, public 
accommodation, public services, and education.11 Unfortunately, 
many handicappers are still deprived of the crucial element for 
success-the opportunity to obtain employment6-because the 
MHCRA as currently interpreted denies protection to those in-
dividuals whose handicaps are related to their ability to perform 
particular job duties.7 Although the MHCRA specifically pro-
vides for accommodation of handicaps,8 those provisions are 
only available if the handicap is unrelated to job duties.9 On the 
surface, this limitation appears consistent with traditional an-
tidiscrimination theory. Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 196410 (Title VII) employers may base employment decisions 
on "job-related" criteria.11 This superficial analysis, however, ne-
OF THE SENATE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN 590 (1976) [hereinafter SENATE JOURNAL]. Sen-
ator Faust further indicated that a handicapped person must be provided "the same 
opportunity as the other applicants." Id. 
4. No. 220 1976 Mich. Pub. Acts 583 (codified as amended at MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. 
§§ 37.1101-.1607 (West 1985)). 
5. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.1101 (1979). 
6. President Kennedy, in his message to Congress introducing the legislation that 
would later become the Civil Rights Act of 1964, stated, "There is little value in a Ne-
gro's obtaining the right to be admitted to hotels and restaurants if he has no cash in his 
pocket and no job." 109 CONG. REC. 11,159 (1963). This proposition is likewise true for 
the handicapped. The fact that, in the first year of the MHCRA's implementation, 94% 
of the cases filed with the Department of Civil Rights alleged employment discrimination 
offers further evidence of the significance of employment. See CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 
2, at 24. The remaining cases were distributed between public accommodation and public 
service. Id. 
7. The Michigan Supreme Court recently held that "the only handicaps covered by 
the [MHCRAJ, for purposes of employment, are those unrelated to ability to perform the 
duties of the position." Carr v. General Motors Corp., 425 Mich. 313, 321-22, 389 N.W.2d 
686, 689 (1986), reh'g denied, 426 Mich. 1231, 393 N.W.2d 873 (1986). 
8. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.1102(2) (West 1985). The statute does not define ac-
commodation, but the term carries a connotation of modifying the work situation to en-
able the individual to do a job that he could not otherwise do as a result of a handicap. 
This is consistent with the common definitions of accommodate: "[to] make fit, suitable, 
or congruous ... to furnish with something desired, needed or suited." WEBSTER'S 
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 12 (1971). 
9. See supra note 7. If a handicap is related to job duties, it is not a "handicap" and 
therefore is not protected by the remaining provisions of the Act. In Carr, the Michigan 
Supreme Court held that summary judgment had been properly granted because the 
plaintiff's handicap was not a "handicap" under the MHCRA, and therefore plaintiff 
failed to state a claim. Carr, 425 Mich. at 316, 323, 389 N.W.2d at 687, 690. 
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982). Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin. Michigan law, in addition to these, protects classi-
fications based on age, height, weight, and marital status. Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 37.2101-.2804 (West 1985). 
11. The United States Supreme Court has said with respect to racial discrimination: 
"If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be 
related to job performance, the practice is prohibited." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 
FALL 1987-WINTER 1988] Improving the MHCRA 285 
glects to take into account important differences between handi-
cappers and other protected groups. 12 
The MHCRA provides protection that is substantially inferior 
to that offered to others.18 Whereas Title VII prohibits "artifi-
cial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment,"14 the 
MHCRA permits existing formulations of job duties to limit job 
opportunities for handicappers. 111 The MHCRA must be 
amended to remove these barriers and allow handicappers to 
compete fairly for jobs. This Note suggests that amending the 
MHCRA to require accommodation even where the handicap re-
lates to job duties18 will provide handicappers protection 
equivalent to that provided to other individuals and will insure 
U.S. 424, 431 (1971). By inference, if a practice is "job-related," then it is not a pro-
scribed discriminatory action. 
12. "[E]ach class carries its own legacy, its own unique characteristics and its own 
problems. Once this is acknowledged, it becomes clear that even where tlie ultimate goal 
is the same for each, the means of effectuating that goal will differ with the class and 
must be tailored to the individual needs." Gittler, Fair Employment and the Handi-
capped: A Legal Perspective, 27 DE PAULL. REV. 953, 959 (1978) (footnote omitted). 
13. The idea that unalterable physical and mental characteristics are not handicaps 
because they are related to job duties sets individuals with handicaps apart from others 
protected by the civil rights laws. An individual's race, color, sex, religion, or national 
origin is not determined by the ability to perform job duties. By focusing on whether an 
individual is "handicapped," the statute fails to consider the important question of 
whether the individual is discriminated against on the basis of a determinable physical 
or mental characteristic. Protection of individuals distinguishable because of race or the 
other Title VII classifications focuses on whether a particular individual is a victim of 
discrimination, and is thus superior to that provided by the MHCRA. 
14. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. 
15. According to the Michigan Supreme Court, the individual's handicap need only 
relate to some assigned job duty to fall outside the protection of the Act. Carr v. General 
Motors Corp., 425 Mich. 313, 389 N.W.2d 686 (1986). The distribution of job duties in 
most work environments developed during a period in which discrimination against the 
handicapped was accepted practice. Cf. Burgdorf & Burgdorf, A History of Unequal 
Treatment: The Qualifications of Handicapped Persons as a "Suspect Class" Under 
the Equal Protection Clause, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW. 855, 861-99 (1975) (describing the 
historically unequal treatment of the handicapped as evidenced in state laws and institu-
tions). This distribution reflects an assumption that the entire work force has "normal" 
capabilities. That assumption must be rejected outright before barriers to handicappers' 
employment can be overcome. New assessments can then be made concerning the appro-
priate distribution of duties in an environment where the labor pool contains individuals 
with differing abilities and limitations. 
16. Although the handicap itself is related to specific job duties, the handicapper 
should not be excluded from consideration for a position if accommodation can make 
that person capable of performing the essential functions of the job. This involves two 
propositions. First, "the qualifications of disabled applicants are to be measured after 
accommodation to the disability of the applicant is made." B. SALES, D. POWELL, R. VAN 
DUIZEND & ASSOCIATES, DISABLED PERSONS AND THE LAW 176 (1982) [hereinafter B. 
SALES]. Second, "it is not necessary that the individual perform every task involved in a 
job. The fact that an individual has difficulty in performing tasks which are marginally 
related to the job should not bar his or her employment." Id. 
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that handicappers are judged on the basis of their abilities, not 
their disabilities. 
Part I of this Note explains the development of· the current 
state of handicappers' civil rights law in Michigan, beginning 
with legislative initiatives and progressing to administrative and 
judicial decisions. Part II analyzes traditional antidiscrimination 
theory and suggests how that theory can be adapted to handi-
cappers. By examining hypothetical situations, Part III exposes 
the disparity between the current state of the law in Michigan 
and the proposed theoretical analysis and suggests amendments 
to the MHCRA to reconcile this disparity. 
I. THE PRESENT EFFECT OF THE MHCRA 
In Carr v. General Motors Corp., 17 the Michigan Supreme 
Court overturned several lower court decisions that held that the 
MHCRA requires accommodation for job-related handicaps.18 
This decision prompted nine concerned organizations,19 includ-
ing the Michigan Civil Rights Commission and the Department 
of Civil Rights, to file amicus curiae briefs in support of the 
plaintiff's petition for rehearing.20 When rehearing was denied,21 
the amici united to seek a change in the legislation. 22 To appre-
ciate the objections to the Carr decision, an understanding of 
the relevant statutory provisions and the varying interpretations 
they have received is essential. 
17. 425 Mich. 313, 389 N.W.2d 686 (1986); see also infra notes 54-64 and accompany-
ing text. 
18. See Cooper, Michigan Handicappers' Civil Rights Act, 63 M1cH. B.J. 826, 830 
(1984); see also Wardlow v. Great Lakes Express Co., 128 Mich. App. 54,339 N.W.2d 670 
(1983). 
19. These organizations were the Michigan Civil Rights Commission, the Michigan 
Department of Civil Rights, the Michigan Trial Lawyers Association, the Easter Seal 
Society of Michigan, Inc., the Women Lawyers Association of Michigan, the Asbestos 
Victims of America, the Michigan Association of Human Rights, the Michigan Lupus 
Foundation, and the Michigan Protection and Advocacy Service. See Carr v. General 
Motors Corp., 426 Mich. 1231, 393 N.W.2d 873 (1986) (denying a rehearing). 
20. Id.; see also Letter from Dolores M. Couter, Michigan Protection and Advocacy 
Service, to Amici (Department of Civil Rights) (Oct. 7, 1986) [hereinafter Couter letter] 
(copy on file with U. MICH. J.L. REF.); Brief Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-Appel-
lee's Motion for Reconsideration, Carr v. General Motors Corp., 425 Mich. 313, 389 
N.W.2d 686 (1986) (No. 74825). 
21. Carr v. General Motors Corp., 426 Mich. 1231, 393 N.W.2d 873 (1986) (denying a 
rehearing). 
22. Couter letter, supra note 20. 
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A. The Statutory Provisions 
The MHCRA guarantees as a civil right the opportunity to 
obtain employment without discrimination because of a handi-
cap. 23 Three portions of the MHCRA are especially relevant to 
this discussion: the statutory definition of handicap;24 the prohi-
bition of discrimination against handicappers in employment;211 
and the requirement of reasonable accommodation.26 
1. The meaning of "handicap"- The MHCRA explicitly de-
fines "handicap."27 Any identifiable physical or mental trait or 
quality that distinguishes an individual28 may qualify as a hand-
icap if there is some physiological cause.29 The MHCRA narrows 
this definition by requiring that the characteristic be unrelated 
to the individual's employment qualifications or ability to per-
form job duties. 30 This stipulation does not limit the characteris-
tics that may qualify as handicaps; rather, it limits the jobs for 
which a given characteristic will be considered a handicap. The 
statute implies that an individual may have a handicap for one 
job position that does not qualify as a handicap for a different 
position. 31 For example, a paraplegic confined to a wheelchair 
23. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.1102(1) (West 1985). 
24. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 37.1103 (West 1985); see infra notes 27-31 and accom-
panying text. 
25. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.1202 (1979); see infra notes 32-35 and accompanying 
text. 
26. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.1102(2) (1979); see infra note 36 and accompanying text. 
27. The statute provides: 
"Handicap" means a determinable physical or mental characteristic of an in-
dividual or a history of the characteristic which may result from disease, injury, 
congenital condition of birth, or functional disorder which characteristic: . . . is 
unrelated to the individual's ability to perform the duties of a particular job or 
position, or is unrelated to the individual's qualifications for employment or 
promotion. 
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.1103(b) (1979). 
28. The statute specifies that a handicap is a "determinable physical or mental char-
acteristic." MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.1103(b) (1979); see supra note 27. Determinable 
means "susceptible of being determined, found out, definitely decided upon or settled." 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 405 (5th ed. 1979). Characteristic means "a trait, quality, or 
property or a group of them distinguishing an individual, group, or type." WEBSTER'S 
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 376 (1971). A handicap must both distinguish the 
individual and be capable of being found out. 
29. The statute provides that a handicap may result from "disease, injury, congenital 
condition of birth or functional disorder." MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 37.1103(b) (1979); see 
supra note 27. The implication is that a handicap is not a condition arising from cul-
tural, environmental, or economic disadvantage, nor is it a condition assumed 
voluntarily. 
30. MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 37.1103(b)(i) (1979); see supra note 27. 
31. Although the definition tells what a handicap is, it does not allow an individual to 
evaluate his mental or physical condition and determine whether or not he is handi-
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may be a "handicapper" subject to statutory protection when 
applying for a job in an office, but not when applying for a job 
on a loading dock. 
2. Prohibiting employment discrimination- A separate por-
tion of the MHCRA prohibits various discriminatory employ-
ment practices.82 Employers cannot discriminate against an indi-
vidual on the basis of a handicap that is unrelated to the 
individual's ability to perform a particular job. 33 Physical or 
capped. Statutes that define the class of protected handicappers in terms of the mem-
bers' qualifications to perform job functions have been criticized for discriminating 
against handicappers by imposing a prerequisite for membership not required of any 
other protected class. B. SALES, supra note 16, at 176; see also Note, Potluck Protections 
for Handicapped Discriminatees: The Need to Amend Title VII to Prohibit Discrimina-
tion on the Basis of Disability, 8 Lov. U. CHI. L.J. 814, 839-43 (1979). Whether or not an 
individual is a member of a racial minority protected by Title VII is not determined on 
the basis of ability to perform job duties. Nor is meeting job qualifications determinative 
of an individual's color, sex, religion, or national origin. 
32. The statute provides: 
(1) An employer shall not: 
(a) Fail or refuse to hire, recruit, or promote an individual because of a handi-
cap that is unrelated to the individual's ability to perform the duties of a partic-
ular job or position. 
(b) Discharge or otherwise discriminate against an individual with respect to 
compensation or the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of a 
handicap that is unrelated to the individual's ability to perform the duties of a 
particular job or position. 
(c) Limit, segregate, or classify an employee or applicant for employment in a 
way which deprives or tends to deprive an individual of employment opportuni-
ties or otherwise adversely affects the status of an employee because of a handi-
cap that is unrelated to the individual's ability to perform the duties of a partic-
ular job or position. 
(d) Fail or refuse to hire, recruit, or promote an individual on the basis of 
physical or mental examinations that are not "directly related to the require-
ments of the specific job. 
(e) Discharge or take other discriminatory action against an individual on the 
basis of physical or mental examinations that are not directly related to the re-
quirements of the specific job. 
(0 Fail or refuse to hire, recruit, or promote an individual when adaptive de-
vices or aids may be utilized thereby enabling that individual to perform the 
specific requirements of the job. 
(g) Discharge or take other discriminatory action against an individual when 
adaptive devices or aids may be utilized thereby enabling that individual to per-
form the specific requirements of the job. 
(2) This section shall not apply to the employment of an individual by his 
parent, spouse, or child. 
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.1202 (1979). 
33. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.1202(1)(a)-(c) (1979); see supra note 32. 
These sections repeat the job-relatedness requirement that first appeared in the statu-
tory definition of handicap. The employment provisions effectively provide that an em-
ployer cannot discriminate against an individual because of a handicap that is unrelated 
to the individual's ability to perform the duties of a particular position. MICH. COMP. 
LAWS § 37.1202 (1979). Inserting the definition of handicap into this provision yields the 
following: "[a]n employer shall not: ... discriminate against an individual ... because 
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mental exams that do not directly relate to the requirements of 
a specified job may not be used as a hiring or promotion crite-
rion. 34 Further, employers cannot discriminate against individu-
als if adaptive devices or aids can be utilized to enable the indi-
vidual to perform the specific requirements of the job.36 
3. The obligation to accommodate- The MHCRA contains 
a provision obligating employers to accommodate handicapped 
individuals unless "the accommodation would impose an undue 
hardship" on the employer.36 This obligation is illusory because 
of the definition of handicap.37 Under a literal interpretation of 
the MHCRA, because the statutory definition of handicap ex-
cludes persons whose distinguishing characteristic is unrelated 
of a ['determinable physical or mental characteristic ... unrelated to the individual's 
ability to perform the duties of a particular job or position or ... unrelated to the indi-
vidual's qualifications for employment,' MICH. COMP. LAWS§. 37.1103 (1979),) that is un-
related to the individual's ability to perform the duties of a particular job or position." 
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.1202 (1979). Read together, the provisions are at least redundant 
and are more probably misleading and ambiguous because it is impossible to give effect 
to both limitations. One Michigan Court of Appeals panel essentially ignored the limita-
tion in the definition by finding that the plaintiff's condition qualified as a handicap 
prior to a determination of whether it was job related. Shelby Township Fire Dep't v. 
Shields, 115 Mich. App. 98, 320 N.W.2d 306 (1982). 
34. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.1202(1)(d)-(e) (1979); see supra note 32. 
35. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.1202(1)(O-(g) (1979); see supra note 32. The statute does 
not define "adaptive devices or aids," nor has case law explained the term. One case 
suggested that an adaptation to the gas mask of a firefighter to allow the mask to seal 
despite the growth of facial hair might qualify as an aid under the statute. The hair 
growth was prescribed as treatment for pseudofoliculitis barbae. Shelby Township Fire 
Dep't v. Shields, 115 Mich. App. 98,320 N.W.2d 306 (1982); see also Couter letter, supra 
note 20. 
36. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.1102(2) (West 1985): "(2) A person shall accommo-
date a handicapper for purposes of employment, public accommodation, public service, 
education, or housing unless the person demonstrates that the accommodation would 
impose an undue hardship." The statute as originally enacted contained an accommoda-
tion requirement that pertained only to employment: "Nothing in this article shall be 
interpreted to exempt a person from the obligation to accommodate an employee or ap-
plicant with a handicap for employment unless the person demonstrates that the accom-
modation would impose an undue hardship in the conduct of the business." Michigan 
Handicappers' Civil Rights Act, No. 220, art. 3, 1976 Mich. Pub. Acts 586 (codified at 
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.1207 (1979)) (repealed by 1980 Mich. Pub. Acts 2075 (effective 
Jan. 20, 1981)). 
37. See Ettinger, Accommodating the Handicapped Employee: When is the Burden 
Undue, 63 MICH. B.J. 831 (1984). Ettinger predicted that harmonizing the employer's 
duty to accommodate with the statutory definition of handicap would be the "focus of 
litigation" and the "greatest challenge" under the MHCRA. Id. This issue has indeed 
been the focus of litigation. See Carr v. General Motors Corp., 425 Mich. 313, 389 
N.W.2d 686 (1986); Rancour v. Detroit Edison Co., 150 Mich. App. 276, 388 N.W.2d 336 
(1986); Wardlow v. Great Lakes Express Co., 128 Mich. App. 54, 339 N.W.2d 670 (1983). 
Calls for reform evidence the inability of Michigan courts to meet the challenge of pro-
tecting handicappers' civil rights under the existing legislation. See Couter letter, supra 
note 20; Note, After Carr: Rehabilitating the Michigan Handicappers' Statute, 33 
WAYNE L. REV. 1133 (1987). 
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to the prospective job opportunity, the accommodation require-
ment only applies if the individual is fully capable of performing 
job duties. 38 The Michigan Supreme Court in Carr adopted this 
strict interpretation of the statute.39 Because a fully capable in-
dividual presumably needs no accommodation, however, other 
authorities have interpreted 'the statute differently.'0 
B. Administrative and Judicial Interpretation 
Prior to Carr, liberal judicial and administrative interpreta-
tion allowed the MHCRA to function despite the apparent con-
tradiction41 between the employer's duty to accommodate and 
the statutory definition of handicap. The Department of Civil 
Rights and the Court of Appeals interpreted the MHCRA in 
light of its perceived mandate: "employment of the handicapped 
to the fullest extent reasonably possible."'2 The Michigan Su-
38. The statute provides that "[a) person shall accommodate a handicapper." M1cH. 
CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.1102(2) (West 1985). Because a handicapper is a person with a 
handicap, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.1103(c) (1979), and a handicap is a "determinable 
physical or mental characteristic . . . unrelated to the individual's ability to perform the 
duties of a particular job or position or . . . unrelated to the individual's qualifications 
for employment," MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 37.1103(b) (1979), only a fully qualified and able 
individual need be accommodated. 
39. Carr v. General Motors Corp., 425 Mich. 313, 389 N.W.2d 686 (1986). See gener-
ally infra notes 54-64 and accompanying text. 
40. The Michigan Court of Appeals has taken this approach, see infra notes 44-49 
and accompanying text, as has the Department of Civil Rights, see infra notes 50-53 and 
accompanying text. 
41. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
42. Allen v. Southeastern Mich. Transp. Auth., 132 Mich. App. 533, 537, 349 N.W.2d 
204, 207 (1983); see also Wardlow v. Great Lakes Express Co., 128 Mich. App. 54,339 
N.W.2d 670 (1983). Toward the goal of greater employment of the handicapped, the De-
partment of Civil Rights recognized claims in at least five categories: epilepsy, heart or 
nervous conditions, and back or vision problems. CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 2 (reporting 
statistics of claims under the MHCRA and categorizing them into the five groups 
mentioned). 
The Michigan Court of Appeals has discussed a variety of handicaps as well. See Ran-
cour v. Detroit Edison Co., 150 Mich. App. 276, 388 N.W.2d 336 (1986) (work-related 
knee injuries); Hines v. Grand Trunk W.R.R. Co., 151 Mich. App. 585, 391 N.W.2d 750 
(1985) (diabetes/insulin dependency); Gloss v. General Motors Corp., 138 Mich. App. 
281, 360 N.W.2d 596 (1984) (back injury); Carr v. General Motors Corp., 135 Mich. App. 
226, 353 N.W.2d 489 (1984), rev'd, 425 Mich. 313, 389 N.W.2d 686 (1986) (back condi-
tion); Allen v. Southeastern Mich. Transp. Auth., 132 Mich. App. 533, 349 N.W.2d 204 
(1984) (high blood pressure and arthritis); Wardlow v. Great Lakes Express Co., 128 
Mich. App. 54, 339 N.W.2d 670 (1983) (weight lifting restriction); Shelby Township Fire 
Dep't v. Shields, 115 Mich. App. 98,320 N.W.2d 306 (1982) (pseudofoliculitis barbae, an 
illness caused by ingrown beard stubble). 
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preme Court, in insisting on a literal interpretation of the 
MHCRA, exposed the underlying deficiency in the law.48 
1. The Court of Appeals/Department of Civil Rights ap-
proach- Prior to the Michigan Supreme Court's decision in 
Carr, the Michigan Court of Appeals liberally construed the 
MHCRA, believing that the law's purpose was remedial." This 
approach led the court to avoid literal interpretations that 
would limit the protection of the Act.46 In Wardlow v. Great 
Lakes Express Co.,"8 the plaintiff suffered an injury but re-
turned to work with a lifting restriction. When later he was laid 
off, he requested a transfer to a job that included lifting. The 
defendant argued that the plaintiff was not handicapped within 
the meaning of the Act and was therefore not entitled to accom-
modation."' The Court of Appeals conceded that a literal read-
ing of the statute supported the defendant's position. Neverthe-
less, the court rejected this interpretation, pointing out that the 
defendant's argument would require accommodation only if the 
handicap were unrelated to the plaintiff's work. No accommoda-
tion would be needed in such a situation. "8 
The court in part justified its liberal approach by def erring to 
the position of the Michigan Department of Civil Rights."9 The 
Department of Civil Rights interprets the statutory provisions to 
require accommodation for any handicap, not just those unre-
43. Carr v. General Motors Corp., 425 Mich. 313, 389 N.W.2d 686 (1986). This case is 
discussed infra notes 54-64 and accompanying text. 
44. Rancour, 150 Mich. App. at 285, 388 N.W.2d at 340; Allen, 132 Mich. App. at 
537, 349 N.W.2d at 207; see also 3 C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
§ 72.05, at 392 (4th ed. 1973 & Supp. 1986) ("There has now come to be widespread 
agreement, however, that civil rights acts are remedial and should be liberally construed 
in order that their beneficent objectives may be realized to the fullest extent possible." 
(footnotes omitted)). 
45. In one case, the court set out the full statutory definition of handicap and stated 
its opinion that the plaintiff had a "handicap" within the meaning of the MHCRA prior 
to a determination of whether his condition was related to his ability to perform the 
duties of the job. Shields, 115 Mich. App. at 103, 320 N.W.2d at 308. This sort of impro-
vising with the statute is also evident in the cases dealing with the conflict between the 
statutory definition and the duty to accommodate. See infra notes 46-48 and accompa-
nying text. 
46. 128 Mich. App. 54, 339 N.W.2d 670 (1983). 
47. Id. at 59, 339 N.W.2d at 672. 
48. The Court of Appeals stated: 
If we were to accept defendant's arguments, the act would be practically mean-
ingless. [The Act] requires accommodation. However, if we ruled that an em-
ployer need not accommodate whenever the handicap is related in any way to 
the job, we would be ruling that the employer need accommodate only if the 
handicap is not related to the work. Of course, in that situation, no accommoda-
tion is needed in the first place. 
Id. at 61, 339 N.W.2d at 673. 
49. Id. at 64, 339 N.W.2d at 674. 
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lated to the ability to perform specific tasks, unless the accom-
modation would cause undue hardship to the employer.50 Ac-
cording to the Department, there are two aspects to the 
obligation to accommodate: (1) altering the physical structure to 
provide access; and (2) modifying the job to permit actual job 
performance. 51 The first aspect conforms to a literal reading of 
the statute, requiring the employer to make structural changes 
so that the handicapper can get to a job he is capable of per-
forming. The second aspect is incompatible with a literal read-
ing; modifications to the job duties would be unnecessary be-
cause an individual's handicap is by definition unrelated to the 
duties. In the Department's view, accommodation means remov-
ing barriers to the employment of the handicapped.52 Although 
an employer need not create a job for a handicapper, nonessen-
tial job features may not exclude handicappers from positions 
where they could be useful employees. 58 
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 65, 339 N.W.2d at 674-75. The court cited an administrative decision, Din-
gler v. General Motors Corp. (No. 37293-El, decided Oct. 23, 1979), in which the Depart-
ment of Civil Rights concurred with the referee who stated, 
Id. 
The obligation to accommodate a handicapped person is twofold. It concerns 
both alterations to physical structures and modifications to the job. The first 
kind of accommodation is necessary to provide access to the place of employ-
ment. It may include the installation of a ramp or elevator or the reassignment 
of parking spaces. The second kind of accommodation is necessary to permit 
actual performance of the job duties. It may include the reassignment of certain 
peripheral duties to other employees or the rearrangement of equipment or fix-
tures in the work area. 
52. This is made clear in Wardlow, which refers to the position taken by the Depart-
ment of Civil Rights in Garcia v. Dannon Milk Products (No. 36557-E7, decided Jan. 22, 
1980): "the department once again adopted the referee's conclusions: 'Accommodation• 
• • requires an employer to reasonably attempt to successfully remove the barrier which 
excludes a handicapped person from employment ... .'" Wardlow v. Great Lakes Ex-
press Co., 128 Mich. App. 54, 65, 339 N.W.2d 670, 675 (1983). 
53. Subsequent decisions by the Court of Appeals clarified the Wardlow analysis. In 
one case, the court determined that the employer did not have to apply a plaintiff-spe-
cific cost analysis to show that he was unduly burdened. Gloss v. General Motors Corp., 
138 Mich. App. 281, 283-84, 360 N.W.2d 596, 598-99 (1984). The defendant claimed that 
a plant could support only a limited number of favored jobs and that transfer to another 
plant would violate contractual procedures. The court indicated that the defendant's 
claims were sufficient to show undue hardship if supported by the evidence, but re-
manded the case because the trial court had not made specific findings on the evidence. 
Id. at 284-85, 360 N.W.2d at 599. 
In another case, the court limited the duty to accommodate to alteration of physical 
structures and modifications of peripheral duties to allow job performance, and held that 
the duty to accommodate does not include new job placement or vocational rehabilita-
tion if an employee is disabled on the job. Rancour v. Detroit Edison Co., 150 Mich. App. 
276, 279, 388 N.W.2d 336, 337 (1986). The court held that an employer is not required to 
do everything reasonably necessary to provide a job for an employee who sustains an 
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2. The Michigan Supreme Court's reading- The issue 
before the Michigan Supreme Court in Carr" was whether a dis-
ability related to performance of particular job duties was a 
"handicap" under the MHCRA.'111 The Court determined that 
the Act covered only conditions unrelated to ability to perform118 
and found that the lower court had misconstrued the legislative 
intent behind the MHCR,A.111 
The facts in Carr were similar to those in Wardlow. In Carr, 
the plaintiff underwent back surgery and returned to work with 
medical restrictions. He was later denied a transfer to a job that 
required lifting in excess of his medical restriction. In finding for 
the defendant, the Court indicated that it was bound by the 
"plain language of the statutory definition."118 The plaintiff ar-
gued that the Act was ambiguous because to read the statutory 
definition literally would render the accommodation require-
ment meaningless.119 The Michigan Supreme Court dismissed the 
plaintiff's argument, finding that accommodations existed that 
were both unrelated to ability to perform and meaningful in 
terms of removing employment barriers.60 
injury on the job and can no longer be employed in the position for which he was hired. 
Id. at 284, 388 N.W.2d at 339. . 
In its handling of the Carr case, the Court of Appeals reiterated the requirement to 
accommodate even in the case of job-related disabilities. Carr v. General Motors Corp., 
135 Mich. App. 226, 353 N.W.2d 489 (1984), rev'd 425 Mich. 313, 389 N.W.2d 686 (1986). 
In that case the court acknowledged a conflict between the prohibition of business ac-
tions taken "because of a handicap that is unrelated to the individual's ability to per-
form the duties of a particular job or position" and the accommodation requirement. 
Carr, 135 Mich. at 233, 353 N.W.2d at 492 (citations omitted). The court again stated, 
"[I]f no obligation exists unless the handicap is job unrelated, no accommodation would 
be required." Id. at 234, 389 N.W.2d at 492. 
54. Carr v. General Motors Corp., 425 Mich. 313, 389 N.W.2d 686 (1986). 
55. Id. at 315, 389 N.W.2d at 687. 
56. Id. at 315-16, 389 N.W.2d at 687. 
57. Id. at 318, 323, 389 N.W.2d at 688, 690. 
58. Id. at 318, 389 N.W.2d at 688. See also IA C. SANDS, supra note 44, § 27.02, at 
459 ("Statutory definitions of words used elsewhere in the same statute furnish official 
and authoritative evidence of legislative intent and meaning and are usually given con-
trolling effect. . .. Where a definition clause is clear it should ordinarily control the 
meaning of words used in the remainder of the act because of its authoritative nature." 
(footnotes omitted)). 
59. Carr v. General Motors Corp., 425 Mich. 313, 318, 389 N.W.2d 686, 688 (1986). 
The existence of ambiguity is significant because, although the general approach is to 
give statutory definitions effect, "the courts are not bound to follow a statutory defini-
tion where obvious incongruities in the statute would thereby be created or where one of 
the major purposes of the legislation would be defeated or destroyed." IA C. SANDS, 
supra note 44, § 27.02, at 459. 
60. Carr, 425 Mich. at 320, 389 N.W.2d at 689. The proposed meaningful accommo-
dations included: modifying building architecture; providing raised door numbers; in-
stalling alternative warning devices; initiating outside interviews and application proce-
dures; and reassigning office and parking locations. Id. 
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This determination was so contrary to previous interpreta-
tions of the MHCRA that Carr, armed with assorted amicus cu-
riae briefs, petitioned for rehearing.61 The petition was denied.62 
The Court amended one footnote to its original opinion,63 but 
refused to reconsider the opinion, thus leaving intact a decision 
61. See Carr, 426 Mich. 1231, 393 N.W.2d 873 (1986) (denying a rehearing). 
62. Id. 
63. Carr v. General Motors Corp., Rehearing No. 173, slip op. at 1 (Mich. Oct. 3, 
1986). Footnote 6 to the opinion originally read: 
6. It should be noted that our holding that the plaintiff in the instant case is 
not a handicapped person in relation to this position for purposes of [the 
MHCRA] and is, therefore, not covered by the provisions of the act, necessarily 
precludes us from making any dete_rmination as to the proper interpretation of 
the terms "reasonable accommodation" and "adaptive devices" as used in the 
[MHCRA]. 
Carr v. General Motors Corp., No. 74825, slip op. at 7 n.6 (Mich. Feb. 7, 1986) (copy on 
file with U. MICH. J.L. REF.). In denying the petition for rehearing the court altered the 
footnote to read: 
6. Our holding that this plaintiff who concedes that he cannot perform the du-
ties of a particular job and who claims that his employer must provide another 
employee to handle part of his duties, had not stated a claim upon which relief 
can be granted, necessarily precludes us from making any determination as to 
the proper interpretation of the term "reasonable accommodation" as used in 
the [MHCRA]. 
We note that plaintiff here has not alleged in his pleadings or to this Court 
that there are adaptive devices or aids which would enable this individual to 
perform the specific requirements of the job or that the fifty-pound weight lift-
ing requirement is merely a pretext for discrimination against the handicapped. 
Carr, 425 Mich. at 323 n.6, 389 N.W.2d at 690 n.6. 
In changing the footnote, the Court retreated from the position that it was precluded 
from interpreting the term "adaptive devices" by its finding that the plaintiff did not 
meet the statutory definition of handicap. This change is consistent with the literal lan-
guage of the statute because the provisions dealing with the use of adaptive aids or de-
vices apply to "individuals" and are not restricted to "handicappers." See MICH. COMP. 
LAWS § 37.1202(0-(g) (1979), supra note 32. 
The court, nevertheless avoided dealing with the "adaptive devices" term by noting 
that the plaintiff did not allege that such aids would enable performance of job require-
ments. Carr, 425 Mich. at 323 n.6, 389 N.W.2d at 690 n.6. This appears to leave open the 
possibility that a plaintiff could allege that adaptive devices might be used to overcome 
the job-relatedness of a disability. Schervish, Carr v. General Motors: Death Knell for 
Handicappers' Job Accommodations?, 66 MICH. B.J. 26, 28 (1987). The court also opened 
the possibility that a handicapped plaintiff could allege that a particular job requirement 
or duty was a mere pretext for discrimination because of a handicap. The notion of pre-
text comes from traditional civil rights analysis and is discussed infra note 97 and ac-
companying text. This addition to the footnote recognizes the doctrine that an employer 
may not consciously discriminate against handicappers by establishing job requirements 
that relate to their disabilities. 
Those who supported Carr in the petition for rehearing were not impressed with the 
altered footnote: 
This modification does little to change the devastating impact of the Court's 
decision on handicappers who require reasonable accommodation in order to 
perform particular job functions. It remains to be seen, in future litigation, how 
the courts will interpret the "adaptive aids and devices" language ... of the 
Act. Cases which allege that facially neutral job requirements are really a pretext 
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that severely limited the employment opportunities of the 
handicapped. 6" 
II. EXTENDING CIVIL RIGHTS TO HANDICAPPERS 
As interpreted by the Michigan Supreme Court, the MHCRA 
does not require an employer to accommodate an individual 
with a handicap that relates to his ability to perform job duties, 
unless adaptive aids or devices would allow performance.611 Al-
though the Michigan Supreme Court looked at the Act's legisla-
tive history, these sources do not conclusively support a literal 
interpretation of the Act. First, the Court cited Senator Faust to 
support the proposition that handicaps related to the individ-
ual's ability to perform job duties are unprotected by the Act.66 
Senator Faust commented that "if a handicapped person seeking 
employment meets the qualifications of the job and can attain 
the performance levels required within a reasonable time, he 
must, by law, be given the same opportunity as the other appli-
cants to secure the position."67 The Senator's language does not 
support the Court's assertion. He states that a handicapper may 
be able to attain necessary performance levels within a reasona-
ble time. It follows, therefore, that the handicapper need not be 
able to perform all duties at the time of hiring. 
Second, the House Legislative Analysis quoted by the Michi-
gan Supreme Court provides support for both an expansive and 
a restrictive view of the Act.68 The legislative analysis mentions 
for discrimination have always been permitted under the civil rights acts, but 
typically are difficult to prove, except under the most obvious cases. 
Couter letter, supra note 20. · 
64. Schervish, supra note 63, at 28. Although the Carr decision may not sound the 
"death knell" for job accommodations, civil rights advocates continue to pursue legisla-
tive changes. Id. at 29; see also Couter letter, supra note 20. 
65. As was suggested supra notes 35 and 63, the breadth of the adaptive devices and 
aids exception is unknown. It would not be inconsistent with the statute to interpret 
these provisions to prohibit discrimination against employees who use adaptive devices. 
For example, an employer could not refuse to consider an amputee for a job because the 
amputee used his own prosthetic limb to perform the job. A more generous interpreta-
tion is that the employer would be guilty of unlawful discrimination if he refused to 
supply an adaptive device or aid that a handicapper needed to perform the job. This 
interpretation is suggested by the change in footnote 6 to the Carr decision, see supra 
note 63. Neither interpretation adequately compensates for the limitations put on the 
accommodation requirement by the Michigan Supreme Court in Carr. 
66. Carr v. General Motors Corp., 425 Mich 313, 319, 389 N.W.2d 686, 688 (1986). 
67. 1 SENATE JOURNAL, supra note 3, at 590. 
68. The quoted portion reads: 
The Apparent Problems to Which the Bill Addresses Itself: 
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traditional attitudes that bar handicappers from jobs they are 
"perfectly capable of performing,"89 but it also notes that handi-
cappers receive less protection than other traditional victims of 
discrimination.70 The key, then, to resolving the problem is not 
only to overcome traditional attitudes, but to raise the level of 
protection of handicappers to that of others. This was the legis-
lature's intent. Handicappers were originally included in what 
became the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (Elliott-Larsen);71 
the provisions prohibiting discrimination under the MHCRA, 
Elliott-Larsen, and Title VII are similar.72 The intent of the leg-
islature is further illuminated by Senator Faust's comment that 
"[t]he bill essentially spells out the ... areas of civil rights, now 
guaranteed to all, and applies them with equal force under the 
Although Michigan law offers protection in most situations from discrimina-
tion based on race, color, religion, national origin, and sex and in some situations 
from discrimination based on age and marital status, existing law offers handi-
cappers [sic, less?] than for others. Traditional attitudes often work against 
handicappers even though they are perfectly capable of performing the jobs for 
which they apply. 
Carr, 425 Mich. at 319, 389 N.W.2d at 688 (quoting Bill Analysis, supra note 2) (altera-
tions are those of the court). 
69. See supra note 68. 
70. See supra note 68. 
71. H.B. 4055 was originally "(a] bill to define civil rights; to prohibit discriminatory 
practices, policies, and customs in exercise of those rights based upon religion, race, 
color, national origin, age, sex, physical handicap, or marital status." H.B. 4055, 78th 
Leg., 1st Sess. (1975) (emphasis added). The Department of Civil Rights objected to the 
inclusion of the handicapped and supported separate legislation. Although part of the 
justification for separate legislation was the particular problems of the handicapped, the 
major objective for the Department of Civil Rights in opposing inclusion of the handi-
capped in the House bill was the hope that in so doing they might relieve themselves of 
administrative responsibility for the handicapped. Interview with Arthur Stine, District 
Executive, Michigan Department of Civil Rights (October 28, 1986); see also Department 
of Civil Rights Memorandum to the Executive Office, Analysis of H.B. 4055, Substitute 
H-4 (Jan. 7, 1976) (copy on file with U. MICH. J.L. REF.). The Department felt that re-
sponsibility for administering legislation for the handicapped would be better placed on 
"other departments [that] possessed the expertise to handle the highly technical 
problems of the handicapped." See Michigan Dept. of Civil Rights, Summary of P.A. 220 
History 1 (undated in-house document) (copy on file with U. MICH. J.L. REF.). That this 
was the Department's primary motivation for endorsing separate legislation is made 
clear by the Department's later opposition to being placed in a position of authority with 
respect to the handicapped under Senate Bill 749, which became the Handicappers Civil 
Rights Act. See Department of Civil Rights Memorandum to the Executive Office, Anal-
ysis of S.B. 749 (June 4, 1975) (copy on file with U. MICH. J.L. REF.). Including handicap-
pers in the original comprehensive civil rights bill demonstrated an intent to provide 
them with the same protection as others, and no negative inference can be drawn from 
their subsequent removal from that legislation. 
72. Compare MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.1102(1) (West 1985) with MICH. CoMP. 
LAWS ANN. § 37.2102(1) (West 1985). Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982) and MICH 
CoMP. LAWS § 37.2202(l)(a)-(b) (1979) with MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.1202(1)(a)-(c) 
(1979). 
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law to this new category."73 Therefore, the intention of the legis-
lature in passing the MHCRA can be understood by studying 
the rights currently guaranteed to others. 
A. Antidiscrimination Theory Under Elliott-Larsen and 
Title VII 
When the legislators thought of the "rights guaranteed to all," 
they were no doubt thinking of the rights guaranteed by Elliott-
Larsen and Title VII. 74 Both statutes, like the MHCRA, address 
the problem of employment rights by prohibiting discrimination. 
Discrimination in employment "occurs when persons who are 
equally capable and qualified for employment are treated differ-
ently because of a factor that is irrelevant to their performance 
as employees."711 The American public considers differential 
treatment on the basis of certain classifications antisocial,76 and 
making employment decisions based on these criteria unfair.77 
Such decisions are perceived as unfair because: (1) the criteria 
themselves do not accurately predict productivity; and (2) they 
involve characteristics that are beyond the individual's control.78 
73. 1 SENATE JOURNAL, supra note 3, at 590. This language is also quoted in Carr v. 
General Motors Corp., 425 Mich. 313, 319, 389 N.W.2d 686, 688 (1986). 
74. To be more precise, they may have been thinking of the predecessor to Elliott-
Larsen, because Elliott-Larsen was itself still proposed legislation. Elliott-Larsen was in-
tended to extend prior fair employment and housing laws to public accommodations and 
education. See Michigan House Civil Rights Comm., Analysis Section, H.B. 4055, at 1 
(Apr. 9, 1978). The MHCRA also extended its protection beyond employment rights to 
other areas protected under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Compare MICH CoMP. LAWS 
ANN. §§ 37.1301-.1303 (West 1985) with 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000a-2 (1982). For the 
present purpose of analyzing employment discrimination, Elliott-Larsen and Title VII 
are appropriate references for the rights guaranteed to all. See also supra note 71 and 
accompanying text. 
75. Peck, Employment Problems of the Handicapped: Would Title VII Remedies Be 
Appropriate and Effective?, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 343, 347 (1983). Individuals of a given 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin have been treated differently on the basis of 
that characteristic alone which is itself irrelevant to their value as employees. Americans 
are committed to the idea that these factors should almost always be irrelevant for em-
ployment determinations. Id. at 345. 
76. Id. at 348. 
77. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHL L. REv. 235, 241 (1971) ("A 
choice made on the basis of an improper criterion-classified by the law as 'invidious' or 
'arbitrary'-is viewed as a particularized wrong. The rejected individual is not being 
treated fairly."). 
78. Id. Professor Fiss talks largely in terms of classes; this Note does not. This Note 
focuses on the idea of distinguishing characteristics, acknowledging that it is difficult to 
define handicappers as a class. See generally Peck, supra note 75, at 356-57 (discussing 
definitional problems associated with enforcing an antidiscrimination statute designed to 
protect the handicapped). Avoiding class definition is consistent with traditional civil 
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Laws prohibiting discrimination thus reflect both a commitment 
to the principle that choices between individuals should be 
based on merit, and a desire to evaluate an individual on the 
basis of criteria that she can control. 79 
"The litany of 'race, color, religion, sex, or national origin' as 
unlawful bases for employment discrimination reverberates in 
the conscience of the American public."80 Title VII prohibits the 
use of these characteristics or traits as criteria for making em-
ployment decisions.81 Historically, discriminatory conduct has 
been based upon these attributes; consequently they serve as the 
focus of antidiscrimination laws. 82 According to the theory just 
described, the use of these criteria in employment decisions is 
unfair-they are poor predictors of performance because they 
are irrelevant to an individual's capabilities,83 and they are be-
yond an individual's control because they are determined at 
birth.lM 
Criteria other than the characteristics enumerated in Title VII 
may be functionally equivalent to the prohibited criteria.811 
Functional equivalence represents the idea that an employment 
decision based on a facially neutral criterion may be thought of 
as a decision based on a prohibited characteristic.86 Establishing 
functional equivalence involves two steps: (1) determining that 
the innocent criterion disproportionately excludes individuals 
rights analysis that focuses on the individual. Race, sex, and the other prohibited criteria 
are all distinguishing characteristics. It is the use of the characteristics that civil rights 
laws prohibit, and classification is only a tool to establish whether an employer is in fact 
using that characteristic or a functional equivalent as a basis for employment decisions 
(i.e., is discriminating on the basis of that criteria). 
79. Fiss, supra note 77, at 241. 
80. Note, supra note 31, at 814. 
81. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982). 
82. For example, Professor Fiss comments that the enactment of prohibitions against 
racial discrimination "was largely a response to patterns of discrimination against Ne-
groes." Fiss, supra note 77, at 236. 
83. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. This analysis rejects any views of in-
nate inferiority. See Fiss, supra note 77, at 241. 
84. Some people perceive religion as a matter of choice within a person's control. 
Although it may be true that one is not bound to adopt the religious beliefs of one's 
parents and that religion need not be determined at birth, children often are encouraged 
to and do adopt their parents' beliefs. In any case, a sincerely held religious belief, 
whether or not passed-down through the believer's family, may in itself put altering that 
belief beyond the believer's ability to control. 
85. See Fiss, supra note 77, at 299. Professor Fiss speaks only of functional 
equivalents of race. His more general concern, however, was with the "common regula-
tory device, the antidiscrimination prohibition." Id. at 235. Applying his theory of func-
tional equivalence to other characteristics subject to antidiscrimination laws is not there-
fore an unreasonable extension. 
86. Id. at 299. "Judging the individual on the basis of this criterion is the equivalent, 
or near equivalent, of judging him on the basis of [one of the forbidden criteria]." Id. 
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who manifest an enumerated characteristic; and (2) demonstrat-
ing that the innocent criterion is unrelated to productivity and 
beyond individual control. 87 If an apparently innocent criterion 
satisfies these conditions, then its use as a basis for employment 
decisions is unfair and equivalent to the use of an enumerated 
characteristic. 
Employers must choose between potential employees and 
make other employment decisions. Not every individual who is 
denied employment is a victim of unlawful discrimination. Only 
discrimination based on distinguishing characteristics that are 
recognized as irrelevant is unlawful. 88 To implement laws 
prohibiting discrimination, one must be able to identify employ-
ers who are in fact basing decisions on irrelevant criteria. Two 
primary analytic approaches have developed for proving unlaw-
ful discrimination: disparate treatment8B and disparate impact.Bo 
The United States Supreme Court has endorsed both of these 
mechanisms in Title VII cases.B1 Although not bound by these 
decisions, Michigan courts consider federal precedent persua-
siveB2 and have expressly recognized both disparate treatment 
and disparate impact.Bs 
87. Id. 
88. Title VII provides: 
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982) (emphasis added). The "because or• language here and in 
Elliott-Larsen, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.2202 (1979), indicates that an employment deci-
sion adversely affecting an individual is prohibited only if it is based on the enumerated 
criteria. 
89. Disparate treatment is the most easily understood theory of discrimination. B. 
ScHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw 15 (1976). This theory seeks to 
identify violations of Title VII by determining whether individuals who possess a partic-
ular characteristic or trait are treated differently from others who are otherwise similarly 
situated. Id. at 16; see also infra notes 94-100 and accompanying text. 
90. Disparate impact theory seeks to identify Title VII violations that are fair in 
form, but discriminatory in operation. The theory acknowledges that employment prac-
tices that disproportionately exclude individuals with particular characteristics but are 
unrelated to the business needs of the employer are prohibited. See Griggs v. Duke 
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); see also infra notes 101-16 and accompanying text. 
91. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (disparate treat-
ment); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (disparate impact). 
92. See Northville Pub. Schools v. Civil Rights Comm'n, 118 Mich. App. 573, 576, 
325 N.W.2d 497, 498 (1982); Civil Rights Comm'n v. Chrysler Corp., 80 Mich. App. 368, 
375 n.4, 263 N.W.2d 376, 380 n.4 (1977). 
93. For cases concerning disparate treatment, see Schipani v. Ford Motor Co., 102 
Mich. App. 606, 302 N.W.2d 307 (1981); Civil Rights Comm'n v. Chrysler Corp., 80 Mich. 
App. 368, 263 N.W.2d 376 (1977); Pompey v. General Motors Corp., 385 Mich. 537, 189 
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1. Disparate treatment- Disparate treatment analysis es-
tablishes a framework for proving intentional discrimination by 
an employer. The analysis presumes that employers have rea-
sons for their employment decisions. If an employer treats one 
individual less favorably than others, and if. the only trait that 
distinguishes the individual is one of the prohibited criteria, 
then it is inf erred that the difference in treatment is based on 
that criterion. The employer is therefore guilty of unlawful 
discrimination. 
In a disparate treatment case the plaintiff must show that: (1) 
he is distinguishable on the basis of one of the prohibited crite-
ria; (2) he sought and was denied an available job for which he 
met the employer's qualifications; and (3) after his rejection, the 
employer continued efforts to fill the position.9 ' Satisfying these 
requirements gives rise to the inference of intentional discrimi-
N.W.2d 243 (1971). For a case concerning disparate impact, see Farmington Educ. Ass'n 
v. Farmington School Dist., 133 Mich. App. 566, 573-74, 351 N.W.2d 242, 245-46 (1984). 
94. This is a restatement of the United States Supreme Court's description of the 
plaintiff's initial burden, articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. u. Green. A prima fa-
de case of racial discrimination may be established by showing: 
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for 
a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his quali-
fications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained 
open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complain-
ant's qualifications. 
411 U.S. at 802. 
Although the McDonnell Douglas case speaks in terms of "belonging to a racial minor-
ity," the Supreme Court subsequently held that Title VII prohibits racial discrimination 
against whites on the same standards as discrimination against blacks. McDonald v. 
Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976). Hence, this aspect of the prima facie 
case is indicated in the text as being "distinguishable on the basis of one of the prohib-
ited criteria." 
Plaintiff can meet his burden of showing that he was qualified merely by showing that 
he fulfills the basic requirements and need not prove that he was the most qualified 
applicant. Cf. Flowers v. Crouch-Walker Corp., 552 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977). That case 
discusses the analogous burden of proving adequate performance in an action challeng-
ing the employee's discharge as discriminatory. Part of the plaintiff's prima facie case in 
the discharge situation was to show that he satisfied normal work requirements. The 
plaintiff met this burden by showing that his work was accepted by the employer. The 
court, however, allowed the defendant to rebut the prima facie case by introducing evi-
dence that the plaintiff's layoff was part of a work slowdown and that the plaintiff's work 
was inferior to that of his coworkers who were not discharged. 
These elements of the plaintiff's prima facie case are not exclusive; "[t]he facts neces-
sarily will vary in Title VII cases, and [this specification] of the prima facie proof ... is 
not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situations." McDonnell 
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n.13. One case has suggested that the final element of the Mc-
Donnell Douglas analysis-that the employer continued to seek applicants-will not be 
an absolute requirement. Peters v. Jefferson Chem. Co., 516 F.2d 447, 449-50 (5th Cir. 
1975). 
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nation,911 shifting the burden to the employer to advance a non-
discriminatory reason for her action and to produce some evi-
dence demonstrating the existence of that reason.96 The plaintiff 
retains the burden of persuasion on the issue of intent, and may 
argue that the employer's stated reason was a mere pretext for 
unlawful discrimination. 97 
For some prohibited criteria an employer may respond to an 
allegation of intentional discrimination by admitting the use of 
the criteria, but claiming the statutory defense of bona fide oc-
cupational qualification (BFOQ).98 The BFOQ affirmative de-
fense is a narrow exception to the general rule that prohibited 
criteria may not be used in employment decisions.99 The em-
ployer carries the burden of persuasion to show that the "es-
sence of the business operation would be undermined" if the cri-
teria were not used as a basis for selection. 100 
95. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (explaining that the 
inference is raised because, if the elements are present and otherwise unexplained, it is 
more likely that the employment actions taken are "based on the consideration of imper-
missible factors"). 
96. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (stating that the 
burden will shift to the employer "to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory rea-
son" for the complainant's rejection). The burden that shifts to the defendant "is to 
rebut the presumption of discrimination by producing evidence that the plaintiff was 
rejected, or someone else was preferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason." 
Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1981). 
97. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 (stating that the plaintiff "must have the opportunity to 
demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment deci-
sion"); see also McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804. 
98. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1982) (allowing the BFOQ, defense to claims of discrimi-
nation on the basis of religion, sex, or national origin); see also MICH. COMP. LAWS 
§ 37.2208 (1979) (allowing the defense in the case of religion, national origin, sex, age or 
marital status, height, and weight). 
99. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333-34 (1977); see also Phillips v. Martin 
Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 545-47 (1971) (Marshall, J., concurring); Diaz v. Pan Am. 
World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 387 (5th Cir. 1971); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. 
Co., 408 F.2d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 1969); E.E.O.C. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of 
Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2 (1987); E.E.O.C. Guidelines on Discrimination on the Basis of 
National Origin, 29 C.F.R. § 1606.4 (1987). 
100. Diaz, 442 F.2d at 388 (emphasis in original); see also Usery v. Tamiami Trail 
Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 236 (5th Cir. 1976) (use of the criteria must be "reasonably 
necessary to the essence" of the business operation (emphasis in original)). For example, 
to rely on a given age standard as a BFOQ the employer must prove that he has reasona-
ble cause to believe that all or substantially all persons not meeting the age criteria 
would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved, or that it 
must be impracticable to determine which individuals not meeting the age criteria are 
incapable of performing safely and efficiently. Tamiami Trail Tours, 531 F.2d at 227-28. 
There is some indication that the obligation on the employer is conjunctive, not disjunc-
tive; it may not be enough to show that substantially all persons not meeting the age 
criteria are unable to perform if a neutral performance standard can determine which of 
those individuals are able to perform. See Phillips, 400 U.S. at 544-47 (Marshall, J., 
concurring) (dealing with gender as a BFOQ). 
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2. Disparate impact- Unlike disparate treatment, disparate 
impact analysis does not focus on intent, but rather on the con-
sequences of employment practices.101 Incorporating the concept 
of functional equivalence, 102 the analysis relies on the premise 
that the law prohibits not only intentional discrimination but 
also "practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in opera-
tion."103 Because Congress enacted Title VII to provide equal 
employment opportunities, the law requires the removal of "ar-
tificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers" that disproportion-
ately exclude individuals with particular characteristics.104 Not 
every practice that has a disproportionate effect will be unlawful 
discrimination.1011 It is the arbitrary and unnecessary nature of 
the employment criteria that renders them discriminatory. If an 
individual can trace failure to satisfy a criterion to a prohibited 
characteristic, and the employer supplies no overriding business 
justification for the use of the criterion, 11141 then making employ-
ment decisions based on that criterion is unlawful. 107 Disparate 
impact theory thus enforces the legislature's intent to require 
employers to "measure the person for the job and not the person 
in the abstract. mos 
To make out a prima facie case under disparate impact analy-
sis, the plaintiff must establish the same elements as under dis-
parate treatment, except that she need only demonstrate that 
but for the challenged neutral criterion she would be qualified 
101. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) ("[G]ood intent or ab-
sence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures or testing mech-
anisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups . . . . Congress directed 
the thrust of the act to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the moti-
vation." (emphasis in original)). 
102. See Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 797 (4th Cir. 1971). But see 
Willborn, The Disparate Impact Model -of Discrimination: Theory and Limits, 34 AM. 
U.L. REV. 799, 812 (1985). Professor Willborn suggests that because the absence of indi-
vidual control over performance of a neutral criterion is not an element of a disparate 
impact case, it does not comport with functional equivalence theory. Functional equiva-
lence is discussed supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text. 
103. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. 
104. Id. 
105. "The classic example of an acceptable practice is an employer's policy, in filling 
secretarial positions, of hiring only applicants who can type even though, especially in a 
limited geographical area it may be much more difficult for Negroes than for whites to 
obtain the necessary training and experience." Robinson, 444 F.2d at 797; see also 
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430 ("Congress did not intend by Title VII, however, to guarantee a 
job to every person regardless of qualifications."). 
106. That is, the criterion is not predictive of performance or productivity. 
107. See generally Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 797-98 (4th Cir. 1971). 
108. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971). 
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for a position.109 In addition, the plaintiff must show that the 
challenged criterion has a discriminatory effect. 110 Once the 
plaintiff establishes this, the burden shifts to the employer to 
demonstrate that the use of the criterion is justified by "busi-
ness necessity .... 11 If the employer meets this burden, the com-
plaining party may still win by showing that other criteria, with-
out the disparate impact, could satisfy the business needs of the 
employer. 112 
The "business necessity" test is often thought of in terms of 
"job-relatedness."113 The mere existence of a legitimate business 
purpose is insufficient to justify the use of a criterion that has a 
disparate impact;114 rather, the criterion must "bear a demon-
strable relationship to successful performance of the jobs for 
which it [is] used."m For a particular neutral criterion to be a 
business necessity, its use must serve an overriding interest and 
be the least restrictive alternative available to accommodate that 
interest. 116 
109. Comment, Handicapped Workers: Who Should Bear the Burden of Proving Job 
Qualifications?, 38 ME. L. REv. 135, 140 (1986). 
110. The plaintiff must show that an otherwise neutral job criterion disproportion-
ately disqualifies individuals who share with her a particular characteristic. For example, 
in the case of race discrimination, the Supreme Court said the plaintiff must establish 
that the facially innocent criteria select applicants "in a racial pattern significantly dif-
ferent from that of the pool of applicants." Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 
425 (1975). 
lll. The Supreme Court first articulated the business necessity requirement in 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Concerning the burden of proof, the 
Court said, "Congress has placed on the employer the burden of showing that any given 
requirement must have a manifest relationship to the employment in question." Id. at 
432. In actual practice, the employer's burden is one of production, and the complainant 
retains the burden of persuasion as to the existence of unlawful discrimination. See 
Comment, supra note 109, at 140. 
ll2. Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 425. 
ll3. See B. ScHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 89, at 132-33. 
ll4. See Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 796-800 (4th Cir. 1971) (distin-
guishing between "business purpose" and "business necessity"). 
ll5. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. 
ll6. Robinson, 444 F.2d at 798; see also Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, 649 F.2d 
670,673 (9th Cir. 1980) (discussing the least restrictive alternative requirement in a.gen-
der discrimination case). 
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R Applying Antidiscrimination Theory to Handicappers-A 
Case-by-Case Approach 
Handicappers experience pervasive discrimination117 in much . 
the same way as individuals protected under Title VII. 118 Be-
cause the MHCRA and Title VII both address the problem of 
employment rights in the same manner, 119 the analytic ap-
proaches developed under Title VII-disparate treatment and 
disparate impact-should also apply to handicappers. 120 
The public may not perceive handicaps as irrelevant to job 
performance, although it does so regard Title VII characteris-
tics. 121 This perception should not, however, bar handicappers 
from participating in the job market. Unfortunately, those who 
determine the structure of jobs-access to facilities, design of 
equipment, and distribution of tasks-assume that all members 
of the labor pool have "normal" abilities. 122 Because of this as-
sumption, job structures disproportionately exclude handicap-
pers.128 If a particular aspect of a job excludes individuals with a 
117. "[D]iscrimination against the handicapped, particularly in the area of employ-
ment is pervasive and thoroughly entrenched in our society." Gittler, supra note 12, at 
953-54. "(E]mployers continue to discriminate against handicapped job applicants be-
cause of stereotypes, prejudices, and misconceptions." Burgdorf & Burgdorf, supra note 
15, at 864. "Handicapped individuals have faced and continue to face discriminatory 
treatment in almost every facet of life." Id. at 909. "It is almost impossible to know how 
many people are affected by discrimination against the disabled." Achtenberg, "Crips" 
Unite to Enforce Symbolic Laws: Legal Aid for the Disabled: An Overview, 4 SAN FERN. 
V.L. REv. 161, 164 (1975). 
118. There is a "close analogy between discriminatory practices against the disabled 
and those against other minorities." Note, Equal Employment and the Disabled: A Pro-
posal, 10 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PaoBS. 457,459 (1974) [hereinafter Equal Employment and 
the Disabled]. "[T]he handicapped and disabled continue to suffer disproportionately 
from chronic unemployment, even though ... , when given the opportunity, they are 
capable of holding a variety of competitive jobs and can perform as well as or better than 
the non-handicapped." Lang, Employment Rights of the Handicapped, 11 CLEARING-
HOUSE REv. 703, 703 (1977) (footnotes omitted). 
119. See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text. 
120. See generally Equal Employment and the Disabled, supra note 118; Note, 
supra note 31. Contra Peck, supra note 75, at 346-47 ("[T]he employment problems of 
the handicapped are not well-suited for treatment under a statutory discrimination 
model."). 
121. Peck, supra note 75, at 348. 
122. Average architects and engineers build and design for the "average" person. 
Achtenberg, supra note 117, at 164. It follows that the normal employer designs job 
structures towards "normal" abilities. 
123. Whether the original motivation was paternalistic, or reflected the societal atti-
tude of "out of sight, out of mind," see id., the fact remains that handicappers have been 
largely excluded from the group of people to whom employers look to provide services. 
Such a situation may be self-perpetuating because once job structures are oriented to a 
particular concept or "normal" individual, individuals not meeting that standard may 
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particular handicap and cannot be justified by business neces-
sity, it is discriminatory under disparate impact theory. To 
equate "job-relatedness" with business necessity in this context 
is inappropriate; if this is done, the handicapper will always 
lose.124 Job-relatedness suffices as an analogue for business ne-
cessity in the Title VII context because, given a population of 
"normal" individuals, the law assumes that there is no inherent 
unfairness in the job structure: nothing inherent in an individ-
ual's race, color, sex, religion, or national origin makes her less 
likely to be able to perform particular job functions. 1u The as-
sumptions made in that context cannot be made in the handi-
capped context. There may, in fact, be something inherent in 
the individual's handicap that prevents her from performing a 
particular job function. Therefore, a different standard of busi-
ness necessity is required.128 
Establishing an adequate standard of business necessity in-
volves determining when an employer's job requirements impose 
artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to handicapper em-
ployment.127 The accommodation requirement set forth in the 
MHCRA128 suggests a business necessity test: the employer dis-
criminates if he does not accommodate a handicapper unless he 
demonstrates that the accommodation would impose an undue 
hardship.129 If the employer cannot demonstrate that it would 
be too burdensome to accommodate the handicapper, then the 
employment criterion that excludes the handicapper is unneces-
sary and fails to meet the business necessity standard. 130 
not easily be integrated into the system. "Non-normal" individuals will be disproportion-
ately excluded when the employer seeks to fill positions within the structure. This situa-
tion is particularly discriminatory in the case in which the structure would have devel-
oped much differently had handicappers initially been included in the labor pool. 
124. In addition, the equation is theoretically unsound. See generally infra notes 
140-45, 151 and accompanying text. 
125. The BFOQ defense to disparate treatment analysis takes into account that nar-
row set of situations where it is thought that something inherent in an individual's sex, 
religion, or national origin makes the individual less satisfactory with respect to a partic-
ular job. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
126. Although the terms "job-related" and "business necessity" are often used inter-
changeably by lower courts, authorities view "job-relatedness" as merely one means of 
proving business necessity. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 89, at 133. 
127. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
128. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.1102(2) (West 1985); see supra note 36 and accom-
panying text. 
129. See supra note 128. 
130. This statement of the business necessity standard is incomplete without some 
definition of "undue hardship." Under the Title VII duty to accommodate in cases of 
religious discrimination, a "de minimis cost" test applies. See Trans World Airlines v. 
Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977). A Michigan Court of Appeals panel, however, has rejected 
this standard with respect to the handicapped. Wardlow v. Great Lakes Express Co., 128 
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Given the appropriateness of applying disparate impact and 
disparate treatment analysis to discrimination against handicap-
pers, and assuming that di:ff erences between handicaps and 
other prohibited characteristics will sometimes require a busi-
ness necessity standard other than job-relatedness, it is impor-
tant to test the analyses in situations faced by employers and 
handicappers. Some situations that employers and handicappers 
encounter are more clearly analogous to cases involving Title VII 
characteristics than others. To give handicappers the same 
rights as others, legislation must apply nondiscrimination theory 
consistently to both the easy and the hard cases. The theories 
adapted from Title VII analysis are applied here to four hypo-
thetical situations in order to establish a benchmark against 
which the outcome of existing legislation may be compared. 
1. Case 1: The completely qualified and fully capable indi-
vidual- If a handicapper seeking a job met all the employer's 
stated qualifications, were capable of performing all job duties, 
had no difficulty gaining access to the work place, yet was de-
nied employment while the employer continued to try to fill the 
position, she would fit squarely within disparate treatment anal-
ysis as it has developed under Title VII. 131 The handicapper 
would be able to make out a prima facie case by showing that 
she was treated differently from people without her handicap. 
The defendant would have an opportunity to show a nondis-
criminatory reason for his decision; likewise, the handicapper 
would have an opportunity to show pretext. The protection pro-
vided to the handicapper would be equivalent to that provided 
others. 
Mich. App. 54, 339 N.W.2d 670 (1983); see also Ettinger, supra note 37, at 832. Cases 
interpreting the MHCRA fail to provide an alternative definition. Id. at 833. The case 
law suggests that whether a burden is undue is a jury question. Id. If leaving this ques-
tion to the jury is acceptable under the current law, there is no reason why it would not 
be equally acceptable under an analysis that makes the undue hardship issue part of the 
employer's business necessity defense. 
On the other hand, a workable definition of undue hardship may be devised from the 
reasons for rejecting "job-relatedness" as the business necessity standard in some cases 
of handicapper discrimination. See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text. If it is 
unfair to use the job-relatedness standard because jobs are designed based on a labor 
pool containing exclusively individuals with normal capabilities, then perhaps it is fair to 
use a standard that asks whether a job structure might have developed differently in the 
absence of prejudicial attitudes. If so, it should not cause undue hardship for employers 
to reorient their job structures retroactively to include the handicappers. If, as a practi-
cal matter, a job criterion that excludes handicappers cannot be separated from the cur-
rent profitability of the employer's business, then the criterion is truly a business neces-
sity, and the employer may continue to use it in employment decisions. 
131. See supra notes 89, 94-100 and accompanying text. 
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2. Case 2: The problem of employer qualifications- If a 
handicapper were capable of performing all job duties and had 
no difficulty gaining access to the workplace, but did not meet 
all the stated job qualifications and was denied employment, he 
would fit squarely within the Title VII disparate impact analy-
sis. 182 He could not make out a prima facie case of disparate 
treatment because he would not be "qualified." He could, how-
ever, challenge the use of the qualification that he failed to 
meet. If the qualification served to exclude individuals with his 
handicap disproportionately, he could establish a prima facie 
case of disparate impact.188 The employer would then have to 
justify the use of the criterion by demonstrating that it was a 
business necessity. This case is analogous to the way in which 
disparate impact analysis is applied to the Title VII characteris-
tics. In this instance, the handicap itself would not limit the 
handicapper's ability to perform the job. Therefore, the job-re-
latedness standard of business necessity would be adequate to 
evaluate the challenged criterion. The protection would be 
equivalent to that provided others. 
3. Case 3: The problem of access- A case that is rarely en-
countered in the Title VII context would arise if the handicap-
per met all qualifications and were capable of performing job 
duties, but because of architectural or other barriers could not 
gain access to the workplace and so was denied employment.184 
The handicapper could not easily show intentional discrimina-
tion in this situation, because the employer could either claim 
that access to the workplace was a prerequisite to employment 
or that inability to enter the building was a sufficient nondis-
criminatory reason for denying employment. In the first in-
132. See supra notes 90, 101-16 and accompanying text. 
133. The kinds of qualification likely to be challenged in this context are employment 
tests or educational requirements that may disproportionately exclude handicappers be-
cause of the limited educational opportunities available to them. See Peck, supra note 
75, at 354; Note, supra note 3i, at 816. This case assumes that the handicapper could 
nevertheless perform the duties of the job, and, therefore, the use of the "qualification" 
is unfair. This is exactly the result reached under Title VII if an employment criterion 
unrelated to the job disproportionately excludes a particular race. Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); see generally supra notes 101-16 and accompanying text. 
134. The most analogous Title VII situation is the case in which the place of employ-
ment lacks facilities for women. Where the employer could not prove that he would have 
to endure unreasonable expense to install them, lack of comfort facilities for females has 
been rejected as a ground for refusal to hire qualified female employees. 1973 EEOC 
Decisions (CCH) 11 6137 (Feb. 19, 1970). To provide equivalent protection to the handi-
capper who is denied access, to jobs because of architectural barriers, the law must obli-
gate the employer to remove the barriers to access unless it would cause unreasonable 
expense-Le., undue hardship. 
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stance, the handicapper would fail to make out her prima facie 
case. In the second instance, the plaintiff could argue that the 
access requirement was a mere pretext for discrimination against 
handicappers. Unless the employer had deliberately built or ac-
quired an inaccessible facility, however, the plaintiff would have 
difficulty prevailing on the issue of intent. 
Alternatively, the handicapper could apply disparate impact 
analysis. She could make out a prima facie case by showing that 
her inability to gain access to the employer's facility was related 
to her handicap. This would satisfy the requirement of showing 
adverse impact on individuals with her distinguishing character-
istic.13~ The employer would then have to show business neces-
sity to justify the requirement that the handicapper be able to 
enter the workplace.138 In one sense, the ability to gain access to 
the workplace is job-related-one cannot perform a job without 
getting to it. In another sense, however, it is not job-related-if 
barriers to access are removed the individual is capable of per-
forming. In this situation, the Title VII job-relatedness approxi-
mation of business necessity would be inadequate to protect the 
handicapper. Applying the alternative business necessity stan-
dard, 137 the employer would have to show that making the nec-
essary accommodations to enable the handicapper to gain access 
to the workplace would cause undue hardship. Otherwise, not 
providing the accommodation would constitute actionable dis-
crimination. Although the job-relatedness standard would pro-
vide handicappers identical treatment to that provided others, 
only the accommodation without undue hardship standard 
135. Often in cases of handicapper discrimination, statistical disproportionalities will 
be difficult to prove due to the small sample of handicapped applicants for a particular 
job. Lang, Protecting the Handicapped From Employment Discrimination: The Job-
Relatedness and Bona Fide Occupational Qualifications Doctrines, 27 DE PAUL L. REv. 
989, 1001 (1978); see also Peck, supra note 75, at 372. Instead, when some aspect of the 
handicap bears a demonstrable relationship to the handicapper's inability to gain access 
to the workplace, it may be inferred that some aspect of the workplace disproportion-
ately excludes individuals with that handicap-if more people with the handicap had 
applied, they too would have been excluded. Even in the absence of a statistically signifi-
cant sampling of individuals with a particular handicap, one can assume that statistics, if 
they existed, would show a disparate impact on individuals with that handicap. This 
logic applies as well to criteria other than access requirements such as the adaptive aids 
and peripheral duties discussed infra at notes 142-45 and accompanying text. 
136. See supra notes 111-16 and accompanying text. 
137. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text. 
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would protect handicappers against arbitrary138 architectural 
barriers to employment.139 
4. Case 4: The problem of job duties- Traditional analyses 
are most difficult to apply in the remaining situation: an individ-
ual who could gain access to the workplace but who was denied 
employment because his handicap prevented him, at least ini-
tially, from performing one or more of the duties of a particular 
job. This individual could not make out a prima facie case of 
disparate treatment because he would not be qualified for the 
job. The requirement that he be able to perform all the duties of 
a particular job would, however, have a disparate impact on 
those with his handicap.140 The employer, then, would bear the 
burden of demonstrating that business necessity required that 
the handicapped applicant be able to perform all job duties. The 
employer could clearly meet this burden if the standard is job-
relatedness. But if this standard were strictly applied, handicap-
pers again would be left with inferior protection. 141 Two exam-
ples demonstrate that the job-relatedness standard can leave ob-
vious victims of discrimination unprotected. 
a. Enabling devices or aids- For some individuals whose 
handicaps prevent performance of job duties, an adaptive device 
or aid could enable them to perform a particular job. The re-
quirement that the job be performed without such a device 
would have a disparate impact on the handicapper.m If the in-
dividual himself possessed such a device, no business justifica-
tion would exist for forbidding its use. 143 If the individual did 
138. In this context, architectural barriers are arbitrary when they could be avoided 
without an unreasonable effort or expense. 
139. In regard to the inadequacy of identical treatment, the following statement of 
the Washington Supreme Court is often quoted: "Identical treatment may be a source of 
discrimination in the case of the handicapped, whereas different treatment may elimi-
nate discrimination against the handicapped and open the door to employment opportu-
nities." Holland v. Boeing Co., 90 Wash. 2d 384, 388, 583 P.2d 621,623 (1978); see Ward-
low v. Great Lakes Express Co., 128 Mich. App. 54, 64, 339 N.W.2d 670, 674 (1983). 
140. See supra note 135. 
141. Accepting that a job-related criterion is not arbitrary with respect to normal 
individuals of different races, colors, sexes, religions, or national origins, the same crite-
rion may well arbitrarily exclude · individuals with specific handicaps. See, e.g., supra 
notes 122-23 and accompanying text. 
142. The fact that the device would enable performance is evidence that the use of 
the device is reasonably related to performance. It must therefore be inferred that handi-
capped individuals who could perform the job with the device will be disproportionately 
excluded by a requirement that they perform without the use of the device. See supra 
note 135. 
143. In this situation, the employer is discriminating against the handicapper because 
of his use of an adaptive device. See the example discussed supra note 65. The require-
ment is either a pretext for intentional discrimination on the basis of handicap or an 
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not possess the device, the employer's failure to provide it would 
need to be justified by business necessity. The requirement that 
an individual perform a job without an enabling device is neces-
sarily job-related; therefore, the job-related standard of business 
necessity would always work against the handicapper. To avoid 
this result, the employer ought to be required to provide the de-
vice-Le., to accommodate the handicapper-unless this would 
impose an undue hardship. As in Case 3, only the latter stan-
dard of business necessity would adequately protect the handi-
capper and allow him to utilize his capabilities. 
b. Peripheral duties- Typically a job includes a number of 
duties, some more essential than others.144 If an individual were 
capable of performing the major duties of a job, but his handi-
cap interfered with performance of a peripheral duty, the re-
quirement that the individual perform all duties would dispro-
portionately exclude individuals with the handicap. This effect 
would have to be justified by business necessity. Job-relatedness 
again would be an inadequate measure of business necessity, be-
cause it would permit the exclusion of all individuals with that 
handicap-the requirement is the functional equivalent of using 
the handicap itself as the basis for the employment decision.1n 
The requirement would be justified by business necessity only if 
filling the position with someone not capable of performing all 
the duties-i.e., having to reassign duties-would cause the em-
ployer an undue hardship. Accommodation without undue hard-
ship again would be the standard necessary to ensure that em-
ployers do not discriminate against the handicapped through 
arbitrary and unnecessary employment criteria. 
III. MAKING THE MHCRA FIT THE ANTIDISCRIMINATION MODEL 
The theoretical framework just presented and the position 
taken by the Michigan Supreme Court differ in approach. The 
theory considers the employment decision and seeks to deter-
mine whether it was made on the basis of a criterion that serves 
arbitrary barrier to employment that appears to lack even a business purpose and cannot 
possibly be a business necessity. 
144. For example, a secretary's primary responsibilities may include typing (or word-
processing), filing, and taking dictation, but she may also be charged with maintaining 
adequate office supplies, answering phones, and picking up the mail; a factory worker 
may be primarily responsible for machining parts, but as a side matter, he may be asked 
to pick up stock necessary in the machining process. 
145. "Functional equivalence" is discussed supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text. 
See also supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text. 
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as an arbitrary and unnecessary barrier to employment of handi-
cappers. 146 The court's approach considers the handicapper and 
seeks to determine whether she is an individual whom the law 
was intended to protect, as if the law commands that some indi-
viduals are to be hired because they are handicapped.147 The 
United States Supreme Court specifically rejected the latter ap-
proach with respect to Title VII, stating that "[d]iscriminatory 
preference for any group, minority or majority, is precisely and 
only what [Congress] has proscribed."148 The difference between 
the two approaches is particularly evident in a comparison be-
tween the theory and the way the Michigan Supreme Court 
would treat the hypothetical cases. The comparison demon-
strates the need to change the law and suggests ways of doing so. 
A. Theory vs. MHCRA: A Direct Comparison 
The Michigan Supreme Court would protect the handicapper 
in Case 1 because she is treated differently for no other reason 
than her handicap. The court's reasoning and the theoretical 
analysis coincide. Similarly, the court would hold that the hand-
icapper in Case 2 is protected; this result is necessary if handi-
cappers are to be treated like all others, because if the same 
qualification disproportionately excludes individuals on the basis 
of race or sex, then its use as the basis of an employment deci-
sion would be prohibited under Elliott-Larsen. 
The court's reasoning and the theoretical analysis arrive at the 
same result in Case 3, but for different reasons. Although the 
theory mandates accommodation because requiring access with-
out accommodation discriminates against the handicapper, the 
court would require accommodation for architectural barriers 
because it is specifically mandated by the Act. Similarly, in Case 
4a, the court would require accommodation by the use of adap-
tive devices only because it cannot read the MHCRA to say 
otherwise. 149 
146. An employment action based on the handicap itself, without regard to the indi-
vidual's capabilities, is prohibited under disparate treatment analysis. Employment deci-
sions based on factors that are functionally equivalent to the handicap are precluded 
under disparate impact theory. 
147. Carr v. General Motors Corp., 425 Mich. 313, 389 N.W.2d 686 (1986) (determin-
ing that the plaintiff was not handicapped within the meaning of the MHCRA and, as a 
consequence, not further examining the employer's behavior). 
148. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). 
149. See supra note 63. 
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The most important difference between the two approaches, 
and the most serious effect of the current law, arises in the case 
of peripheral duties: Case 4b. Carr v. General Motors Corp. in 
essence held that the MHCRA does not protect the handicapper 
in this situation,1110 whereas the theory indicates that the handi-
capper is a victim of discrimination. 
B. Amending the MHCRA 
Inserting the following provision into the MHCRA would 
overcome the specific holding in Carr: If duties may be reas-
signed without undue hardship, thereby enabling the individual 
to perform the essential requirements of the job, discriminatory 
actions are prohibited. Such a correction would not, however, 
overcome all of the deficiencies of the law. To do this would re-
quire more fundamental changes in the MHCRA. 
1. Disposing of the job-relatedness requirement- A first 
step in doing away with the discriminatory effect of the 
MHCRA is to remove all references to job-relatedness in the 
definition and the prohibition. Although it is likely that these 
references originally were placed in the Act as an attempt to de-
fine discrimination as it pertains to handicappers, m in practice 
they have provided unforeseen obstacles. m 
Deleting job-relatedness from the definition will probably 
raise objections that the definition of handicap is too broad,u3 
150. 425 Mich. 313, 389 N.W.2d 686 (discussed supra notes 54-64 and accompanying 
text). The dissenting opinion of Justice Levin, however, would permit the reassignment 
of peripheral duties. Id. at 330-32, 389 N.W.2d at 691 (Levin, J., dissenting). 
Concerning the theoretical result, see supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
151. The provisions were not in the MHCRA as first introduced in the Michigan Sen-
ate but were added during the debate. See Carr, 425 Mich. at 320 n.l, 389 N.W.2d at 689 
n.1. Job-relatedness perhaps was adopted to appease employers who were concerned that 
the legislation would require them to hire unproductive and incapable individuals merely 
because they possess handicaps. Such a serious concern might account for the redun-
dancy resulting from the job-relatedness notion's inclusion in both the definition of 
handicap and the prohibition of discrimination. See supra note 33. 
152. The differences of opinion between the Court of Appeals and the Michigan Su-
preme Court, see supra notes 48, 57 and accompanying text, and even among the Michi-
gan Supreme Court Justices, see Carr v. General Motors Corp., 425 Mich. 313, 389 
N.W.2d 686 (1986) (compare the majority and dissenting opinions), demonstrate that 
even with these references to job-relatedness, major uncertainties exist in the law. See 
generally Wardlow v. Great Lakes Express Co., 128 Mich. App. 54, 71, 339 N.W.2d 670, 
677 (1983) (Bronson, J., concurring). 
153. It is likely that the breadth of the definition led to the inclusion of the job-
relatedness limitation. See supra note 151. The broad language seems to have aroused 
concern that too many people would be included within the protection of this civil rights 
law. This concern is inappropriate in light of the all-inclusive terms like race, color, sex, 
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but this criticism of the new definition would overlook its subtle 
merit. The MHCRA definition neatly parallels the criteria in El-
liott-Larsen. Unlike the federal definition,111' which seems to 
identify a distinct protected group, the MHCRA allows that any 
individual may be a handicapper in some context, just as every 
individual is of some race or sex. The law was intended to en-
hance employment opportunities of disabled individuals just as 
early fair employment laws were intended to enhance opportuni-
ties of blacks. To accomplish this goal, the legislature chose to 
eliminate any preference in employment decisions. When the fo-
cus of the legislation is seen as precluding di!:!crimination on the 
basis of unfair criteria, rather than as protecting a particular 
group, the propriety of an inclusive definition is apparent. 
2. Removing the specific affirmative provisions- By specifi-
cally excluding certain practices,11111 the MHCRA implies that ab-
sent these specific provisions the prohibited practices would be 
acceptable. By requiring employer action, 1116 it implies that such 
action would not be demanded by a mere prohibition against 
discrimination. Because antidiscrimination theory itself would 
(1) prohibit the use of physical or mental exams unrelated to job 
duties, (2) prohibit discrimination when the use of adaptive aids 
or devices would enable job performance, and (3) require accom-
modation when it would not cause undue hardship, specific pro-
visions detailing these points may and should be removed from 
the law.1117 
3. Satisfying the need for certainty- Following the pro-
posed theoretical analysis, the MHCRA, stripped of the restric-
tive portions of the definition and the unnecessary affirmative 
religion, and national origin, which appear in Title VII, and the additional characteristics 
of age, height, weight, and marital status in Elliott-Larsen. The breadth of the definition 
should not be significant; nobody objects that the law protects individuals of all races. 
There is no reason not to protect all individuals who manifest some determinable, unal-
terable physical or mental characteristic. Nevertheless, because the definition has been 
criticized as too broad in its present form, see Bill Analysis, supra note 2, at 3, removing 
the job-related provision of the definition will revive criticism. 
154. 29 u.s.c. § 706(8) (1982). 
155. See MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 37.1202 (d)-(g) (1979); supra note 32. 
156. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.1102(2) (West 1985); see supra note 36. 
157. Testing that is unrelated to job duties is prohibited under the nondiscrimination 
theory of disparate treatment analysis, see supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text. 
Discrimination against individuals when enabling aids are available is likewise prohibited 
by antidiscrimination theory. See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text. Finally, 
accommodation is required when it will not impose undue hardship because this is the 
standard of business necessity necessary to make disparate impact theory work for hand-
icappers. See supra notes 138-39, 145 and accompanying text. The specific provisions are 
thus unnecessary and tend to be a source of confusion. They should therefore be 
repealed. 
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prov1s1ons, is adequate to protect handicappers' civil rights. m 
Two facts, however, prompt some additional explanation of the 
way in which antidiscrimination theory applies to handicappers. 
First, the Michigan Supreme Court is likely to interpret such 
modifications of the MHCRA as reducing the rights of handi-
cappers.159 Second, it is unlikely that such a pared-down version 
of the law would pass the legislature.160 Dealing with these polit-
ical realities forces some retreat from the effort to avoid further 
defining "handicapper" and "discrimination." Perhaps the least 
intrusive way to clarify when discrimination occurs-and to re-
assure employers who reject unqualified individuals that they 
need not fear legal action-is to define a "qualified individual." 
Defining a "qualified individual" as an "individual who, with 
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions 
of the job in question,"161 and inserting this term into the re-
maining portions of the prohibition, 162 should solve the problem 
158. In this form, the statute merely requires that employers not discriminate-the 
same requirement put on employers with respect to other distinguishing characteristics. 
Nondiscrimination theory precludes the use of arbitrary and unnecessary employment 
criteria that act as barriers to employment. If a facially neutral job criterion dispropor-
tionately excludes individuals with a particular handicap, the employer, to overcome an 
inference of unlawful discrimination, must demonstrate that the criterion is required by 
the needs of his business. If the handicap is unrelated to the job, then the use of _the 
criterion will be considered a business necessity if the criterion is job-related. If the 
handicap is related to the job, the use of the criterion will be considered a business 
necessity only if requiring the employer not to use the criterion would impose an undue 
hardship. Eliminating the job-relatedness provisions from the statute removes a limita-
tion on the protection of the handicapped. Affirmative provisions are not needed to cre-
ate a duty to accommodate because that duty is inseparable from the duty not to 
discriminate. 
159. In Carr, the court exhibited a definite leaning toward employer interests. The 
court initially interpreted the Act so as not to apply the adaptive devices or aids provi-
sions unless the handicap in question is unrelated to job duties. See supra note 63. The 
court in Carr seemed intent on limiting any affirmative duty placed on employers. See 
generally Carr v. General Motors Corp., 425 Mich. 313, 389 N.W.2d 686 (1986). This 
result in part may have been due to the filing of a brief amicus curiae by the Michigan 
State Chamber of Commerce in support of General Motors. See id. at 315, 321, 389 
N.W.2d at 687, 689. Unlike the Chamber of Commerce, the Department of Civil Rights 
was not even aware that the Court of Appeals decision in Carr was coming up for review, 
and failed to file any briefs. Interview with Arthur Stine, supra note 71. For whatever 
reason, the court appears inclined to interpret handicapper rights narrowly. Conse-
quently, the mere removal of the affirmative obligations might be read by the Court as a 
signal that even the limited accommodation requirement it would allow under the pres-
ent MHCRA need not be imposed on employers. 
160. See Carr, 425 Mich. at 320 n.1, 389 N.W.2d at 689 n.1. Attitudes may not have 
changed enough to allow passage of legislation without some limitation that protects em-
ployers from a perceived obligation to hire individuals who cannot contribute to the 
profitability of their businesses. See supra note 153. 
161. See B. SALES, supra note 16, at 176. 
162. The revised statute would read: 
Sec. 202 (1) An employer shall not 
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of uncertainty. If "reasonable accommodation" is taken to mean 
accommodation that would not impose an undue hardship on 
the person required to provide it, then the statute provides all 
the protection suggested by the theory. Employers would be put 
on notice that they must consider the capabilities of a handicap-
per and not exclude an individual based on a compensable disa-
bility. At the same time, employers would realize that when the 
individual cannot with reasonable accommodation perform es-
sential job functions, there would not be any liability for an ad-
verse employment decision. 
CONCLUSION 
The Michigan Handicappers' Civil Rights Act, as interpreted 
by the Michigan Supreme Court, does not adequately protect 
handicappers. Because the law precludes accommodation for 
job-related handicaps, handicappers are disproportionately ex-
cluded from the workplace. A proper adaptation of traditional 
antidiscrimination theory to the handicapper allows for such a 
disproportionate e:ff ect only when it is justified by business ne-
cessity-that is, only when accommodating the handicapper 
would cause the employer undue hardship. If handicappers are 
to be given the opportunity to succeed without discrimination, 
the MHCRA must be changed. 
The MHCRA should be amended to remove the "job-related-
ness" language from the definition of handicap and the prohibi-
tion· against discrimination. Further, specific affirmative provi-
sions should be deleted because they are redundant. Finally, the 
definition of a "qualified individual" should be introduced into 
(a) Fail or refuse to hire, recruit, or promote a qualified individual because of 
a handicap. 
(b) Discharge or otherwise discriminate against a qualified individual with re-
spect to compensation or the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, be-
cause of a handicap. 
(c) Limit, segregate, or classify an employee or applicant for employment in a 
way which deprives or tends to deprive an individual of employment opportuni-
ties or otherwise adversely affects the status of an employee. 
Compare the revised text with M1cH. CoMP. LAWS § 37.1202 (1979); see supra note 32. 
The change both simplifies the statute and makes it more nearly parallel to the compara-
ble provisions in Elliott-Larsen. See M1cH. CoMP. LAWS § 37.2202(a)-(b) (1979). 
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the statute to resolve the problem of uncertainty in 
interpretation. 
-Aldebaran Bouse Enloe 
